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Ai\1ERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY

The Commencement Address
Saint Mary's College
Notre Dome, Indiana
June 6, 1953
The Honorable Michael Mansfield

Vol. XIX

No. 3

American Foreign Policy
HONORABLE MICHAEL

MA

SFIELD

United States Senator from Montana

When the first bachelor ' degrees
were conferred by aint Mary's
College over fifty years ago, foreign policy might have seemed an
inappropriate uhject for a commencement addre
to a wotnan's
college. Events in the world outside
the United tates were then of little interest to mo t Americans, including the men. The voteless women graduates, in those days, were
restricted to a few carefully selected occupations and were frowned
into silence if they dared to voice
opinions when the conversation
turned to local politics, let alone to
international politics. When Mrs.
Man field graduated from Saint
Mary's, at least local politics and
even national politics had become
respectable. You young ladies hon-

is to try to introduce some of the
decency that is found here on this
campus into the larger relations between nations. And because this
problem is of vital importance in
your lives as it is in mine, I want
to talk to you about it this morning.
Let me begin by pointing out
that foreign policy is not a formula out of the laboratory of an alchemist. It is not a potion which is
guaranteed to cure the ills of the
nation and the world's ills in a single dose. There is nothing supernatural about foreign policy and
none of us need to stand in awe of
it. Foreign policy is made by human beings for human situations.
It is simply the course of action
which we take to safeguard the nation and guide its progress in a
very imperfect and dangerous
world.
Underlying the general policies
which we have followed in foreign
policy during the postwar years
have been certain inescapable re-

been the need for material aid in
many areas of the world since the
end of the war. There may be differences of opinion- not at this
college, I hope-as to whether the
United States, as a nation, should
assist in satisfying this need. There
are few, however, ~-ho would deny
that the need exists or that it is contributing to a worldwide discontent
and fertilizing the growth of totalitarianism.
Finally, the most pressing reality
that has confronted our foreign
policy is that there is once again
loose in the world a totalitarian nation of great power bent upon
world domination. The recent death
of Premier Stalin and subsequent
conciliatory gestures by his successors do not give us any reliable
reason to believe that this reality
has changed. An enigmatic scowl
has replaced an enigmatic smile
within the Kremlin, but the aims of
Communism remain unchanged.
I am sure that all of you are fa-

freedom which, together with other
values of the spirit, has been threatened by the rise of totalitarian
Communism.
What kind of foreign policy
would weave these aims into a pattern fitted to the realities of our
time? This question has occupied
those who have been concerned with
foreign affairs almost since the
close of World War II. First we
found it necessary to abandon isolationism. Isolationism has been
useful to our nation for the first
century and a half of our history
because it had allowed us to concentrate our full energies on spanning the continent and developing
our resources.
That' isolationism, however, was
only possible because the nations of
Europe were absorbed in their own
affairs and because the oceans in
those days actually could serve to
some degree as protective moats.
At that time, moreover, economic
self-sufficiency was more of a pos-

precluded a return to isolationism
in the days after World War II.
Communist infiltrators showed no
respect for national boundaries. By
external aggression or internal subversion the Communists were set
upon conquering the world. If the
United States had withdrawn from
its international responsibilities,
the rest of the nations would soon
have been overrun by the Communists. How long could the United States have existed in freedom
in a hostile totalitarian world? If
it is difficult today to maintain our
liberty against external threat and
internal pressures, how much harder would it be without allies, pressed by enemies, and denied the
trade and raw materials which
form a substantial part of our economy?
The only answer for the United
States at the end of World War II
was to abandon isolationism and to
continue to assume war-born responsibilities beyond our borders

helping others, or, to put it another way, in helping others, we have
strengthened ourselves. Immediately after the war we devoted ourselves to making peace settlements
which would provide the framework for the resumption of normal
international relations among all
nations. We set about building a
United Nations which would have
primary responsibility for settling
disputes and maintaining international order.
Our hope for peace was based on
the expectation of cooperation for
peace among the nations of the
world. We believed other nations
wanted peace just as much as we
did.
By the end of 1946, however, Soviet aims had become quite clear
to most of us. While this country
had disarmed hastily, the Communists had continued to keep an enormous mass of soldiers in a state of
readiness, and had embarked upon
a program of limitless expansion.

were the birthplace and cradle of
western civilization. The institutions under which we live, the
hopes we cherish, the origins of
most of our citizens, were rooted in
Greece and Western Europe. By
J 950 the basic aims of the Marshall
plan had been largely achieved.
The Communists in Western Europe
had made every effort to sabotage
the project, and they had failed.
Following a trip to Western Europe last year, I reported that political stability was being maintained in that area. I also noted
that industrial production in France
had set a postwar record during
1952 and that the economies of
Italy and Western Germany were
stronger than they had been in
many years. Everywhere there were
signs of increasing financial stability.
In Europe these days, you can
sense a healthy and encouraging
impatience with continued dependence on assistance from the Uni-

ted tate . It i eloquently expre ed in their logan "trade, not aid".
e mu t olve together with the
Europeans thi que tion of imbalance of trade if for no other rea on than that continued one-way a i tance tend to eparate rather
than bring together the giver and
the receiver. Despite outward expre ion of gratitude from them
and profe ions of magnaminity
from u , there is bound to he an underlying note of re entn1ent on our
part for having to give away our
re ource
eemingly without end,
on their part for having no alternative to continued dependence on us
except to turn eastward to trade and
tyranny. That there hould be some
resentment on both side need not
di may or alarm us. It is a human
reaction to a human situation, one
which I am ure all of us have experienced in our live . Rather than
lo e patience, we mu t seek to establi h greater reciprocity between
the Europeans and ourselves. The

Soviet Union has sought and undoubted!y will continue to seek to
drive a wedge between us and Western Europe.
Although the way ahead for Europe both politically and economically still is beset with many pitfalls, the gloom of defeatism that
once hung over the region has lifted. Europeans dare to believe again in a future of freedom. This
restored confidence is due in no
small measure to the far-reaching
security system which we, in concert with the Europeans, undertook
to build in order to protect the
area from sudden invasion. The
United Nations Charter provides
the basis for this system. Under its
provisions we had, in September
1947, already joined with the Latin American countries in establishing a system of mutual defense for
the Western Hemisphere. Later,
this country worked out a similar
plan of mutual defense with the
Western European nations. On Ap·

ternal pressure can be stopped if
we follow, as we have for the past
seven years, a policy o£ no appeasement, cooperation with free nations,
and devotion to peace. We have negotiated with the Russians-as in
the case of Berlin, but we have not
appeased. Here at home we have
refused to retreat into a new isolationism, and, at the same time, we
have held in check those who think
that a bomb dropped on Moscow
would not only begin a war but
end it.
Turning closer home, we see that
the Communists have made substantial inroads, especially in Guatemala, while the attention of the
United States was diverted to the
more pressing problems o£ Europe
and Asia. The relative neglect of
Latin America during the postwar
years has understandably caused
resentment among our southern
neighbors. It should be now ended
to prevent any further spread of
the Communist infection.

good and evil. Properly channelled,
it could create friends and allies in
our struggle for a free world. Unguided, it could fall prey to the enticements of Communism.
Faced with this danger, we have
pursued our policy of enlightened
self-interest. We have encouraged
the political independence of the
Asian nations when feasible; we
have given technical and economic
assistance and encouraged cultural
exchange to increase the stability
of these new independent nations;
and we have concluded military
agreements to protect the freedom
of this area. By these methods we
have sought to stimulate the potentials for good in the Asian transition, and to safeguard against the
potentials for evil.
Finally, any discussion of United States foreign policy must turn
to Korea. In that country, on June
25, 1950, Communist imperialism,
for the first time since the end of
World War II, resorted to the tac-

tic of armed invasion. The issue
immediately became larger than
Korea. It became, in the final analysi , the is ue of peace or general
war.
The re ponse of the free world
was immediate. Americans gave
their pontaneous and wholehearted
upport to the principle of meeting
armed aggression with armed resistance. The objectives which we had
in going into Korea, 1950, and
which we till have, are to preserve
the outh Korean Republic; to stop
and to puni h the aggression against
the Republic; to make clear to all
would-be imperialists, as we failed
to make clear to the imperialists in
the thirties, that the force of tyranny will be stopped by the force of
freedom. By standing against a local aggression we hope to prevent
a general war later; by fighting in
Korea now we hope to ave this
land of ours from attack in the future. We have tried to achieve these
objectives without drifting into a

full-scale third world war and without getting our armed forces snarled in an endless involvement on
the vast Chinese mainland.
In concluding my remarks to you
tonight, I should like to refer again
to His Holiness, to the statement he
made on Christmas, 1948. He said,
"A people threatened with an unjust aggression, or already its victim, may not remain passively indifferent, if it would think and act
as befits a Christian. All the more
does the solidarity of the family of
nations forbid others to behave as
ntere spectators in an attitude of
apathetic neutrality . . . Their defense is even an obligation for the
nations as a whole, who have a
duty not to abandon a nation that
is attacked."
That is precisely the philosophy
which we have been trying to carry out in Korea.
It is not always easy, however, to
convert beliefs of this kind into action. From time to time all of us

are tempted to try to get peace the
ea y way.
e want to carry our
world re pon ibiJities but we would
like to lighten the burden. Thi
immaturity i not merely an affliction of the young; all of us have it
in orne degree and ometimes it
affects the elders even more. When
thi i o, it is fortunate that we
have younger people to remind us
of our obligations. Ju t recently returned from Korea are orne of the
young men who have probed the
measure of tlte devotion which freedom entails. They have been hurt,
some very badly, in the process,
and they have left hehind in Korean oil many thou and of their
friend . The e sacrifices have a
penetrating meaning for us. They
are a tin1ely reminder that there is
no ea y way to peace and stability
for human society. But they also
tell u that if we will it, and if we
work at it as individuals and as a
nation, we can move the world

closer to the day when all mankind
shall know a deep spiritual unity
under the fatherhood of God.

